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This paper is about evaluating and comparing the portfolio preferences of domestic and foreign 
mutual funds in developed and emerging markets over the period 1998–2007. We find that 
foreign and domestic mutual funds have some different preferences toward firm characteristics 
and firms’ information environments, and economic development affects the preferences for both 
types of funds. A country’s characteristics and institutions also influence mutual fund investment 
decisions when fund managers form their portfolio holdings. Results further show that foreign 
and domestic mutual funds play a monitoring role in their portfolio firms, but foreign mutual 
funds cannot monitor firms effectively in emerging markets.  
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1. Introduction to Literature on Ownership 
Capital markets have become even more integrated and globalized over the last two decades as 
revealed by the mutual dependence of markets during and after the global financial crisis. This 
globalization reduces investment costs and constraints, which allows investors to reallocate 
assets easily across markets. It also enables companies to finance their projects through world 
capital markets. This pool of foreign capital is especially important for emerging markets 
because foreign capital not only increases market value, it also improves liquidity while reducing 
cost of capital (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Despite the rapid liberalization 
of capital markets in both developed and emerging economies, foreign financing and access to 
49 
 
foreign capital still vary considerably across firms and countries (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Leuz 
and Warnock, 2009).  
Previous studies in general focused on one developed market or some emerging markets as a 
group to reveal portfolio preferences of foreign investors; some studies focused on all national 
markets (for example, see Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki, 
2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). It is still not clear whether foreign investors have different 
preferences for firms in developed and firms in emerging markets. Fan, Wei, and Xu (2011) 
argue that firms in emerging markets are structurally different from firms in developed markets. 
Therefore, some factors discovered in the previous literature may have different effects on 
investor’s choice of firms in developed versus emerging markets when attracting foreign 
investors. It is essential to understand what the differences are so firms in emerging markets may 
grow faster and more efficiently with the competition provided by foreign capital in order to 
catch up and compete with firms from developed markets.  
This study focuses on one type of institutional investor namely mutual funds to investigate 
whether foreign investors have different preferences for firms in developed and emerging 
markets. It could document whether factors in previous studies show different effects on foreign 
and domestic ownership in developed and emerging markets. Mutual fund holdings are grouped 
into foreign and domestic portfolios. Mutual funds from locations domiciled in countries other 
than the country where the firm is located are classified as foreign investors. If mutual funds and 
firms are both located in the same country, the mutual fund ownership is classified as domestic 
ownership.  
Second, we explore how firms’ information environments affect mutual fund holding 
decisions. Previous studies usually document that foreign investors suffer from more information 
disadvantages than domestic investors (Bohn and Tesar, 1996). Thus, foreign investors in Japan 
and Sweden like to hold large stocks because large stocks are more visible and have more 
information than small stocks (Kang and Stulz, 1997; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001). We 
investigate whether foreign and domestic mutual fund ownership varies across different firm-
level information measures. Three dimensions of measure for a firm’s information environment 
are used to proxy for the level of information asymmetry in different aspects. They are 
accounting standards (GAAP and IAS adoption), earnings management (accruals, earnings 
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smoothing, and earnings correlation) and analyst variables (number of analysts covering a firm, 
analyst forecast errors, and analyst forecast dispersion). Results generally confirm the 
conjectures but with some variations.  
Accounting standards and analysts play a major role on both foreign and domestic mutual 
fund ownership. Foreign ownership increases with good accounting standards, better analyst 
coverage, and lower analyst forecast dispersion. However, the effects of good accounting 
standards and lower analyst forecast dispersion reduce when foreign mutual funds invest in 
emerging markets but remain strong for domestic mutual funds in both developed and emerging 
markets. Earnings management seems to have little effect on the investment decisions for both 
foreign and domestic mutual fund holdings. 
We also explore country characteristics as to whether these have an asymmetric impact on 
foreign and domestic mutual fund ownership. Foreign fund preference toward country 
characteristics is similar in both emerging and developed countries. Higher GDP and larger size 
of stock market have a negative effect on foreign ownership. These results are consistent with 
previous literature that international investors prefer small markets to diversify their portfolio 
holdings (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Foreign trades, however, have a large positive impact on 
foreign mutual funds. This effect is indicative of the importance of visibility and familiarity for a 
country to attract foreign capital (Chan, Covrig and Ng, 2005). Contrary to foreign investors, a 
larger stock market has a positive effect but greater foreign trades have a negative impact on 
domestic mutual fund ownership. This negative effect of international trades is driven by 
emerging markets. In the developed markets, domestic fund ownership is positively associated 
with foreign trades. 
Finally, legal environment plays important role on foreign mutual fund investment decisions. 
Foreign mutual funds can only effectively monitor their holding firms in developed markets. 
Previous literature documents that country’s laws and disclosure quality affect foreign investors’ 
intention to enter a market or to hold a firm’s stock (Gelos and Wei, 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 
2008; Leuz et al., 2009). Here, security regulations, disclosure requirements, accounting standard, 
and anti-self-dealing are used to proxy for the enforcement of security laws, a country’s 
disclosure quality, the firms’ financial disclosure quality, and the quality of corporate governance 
in the country, respectively.  
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These factors are supposed to be positively related to foreign mutual fund ownership. 
Results show that security regulations, disclosure requirements, accounting standard, and anti-
self-dealing are all positively related to foreign ownership in both developed and emerging 
markets. However, domestic mutual funds in general care more about disclosure requirements 
and anti-self-dealing but pay less attention to security regulations. When domestic mutual funds 
invest in emerging markets, all of these laws become important.  
With regard to firm characteristics, existing results show that foreign mutual funds in 
general prefer firms with large size, lower dividend yields, higher operating performance, more 
cash holding, and lower closely-held ownership. They also prefer younger firms, growth stocks, 
member firms of MSCI index, and firms with American Depositary Receipt (ADR) issuance. 
These preferences are driven by developed markets because a relatively large number of listed 
companies worldwide are from developed markets. Contrary to developed markets, foreign 
mutual funds in emerging markets focus more on firms’ operating performance, such as ROE and 
sales growth. They also do not care about dividend yields. Although foreign mutual funds still 
prefer MSCI members, they have less of a preference for firms with ADR issuance. Aggarwal et 
al. (2005) explain that this may be due to low cross-listing in emerging markets. When pooling 
developed and emerging markets together, domestic mutual funds generally have preferences 
similar to foreign mutual funds, but they do not care about firm size and dividend yields. In 
addition, MSCI membership and ADR issuance actually are not important to domestic mutual 
fund ownership. The portfolio preferences are similar in developed markets. When comparing 
portfolio preferences in developed and emerging markets for domestic mutual funds, domestic 
mutual funds in emerging markets place more of an emphasis on dividend yields, ROE, and sales 
growth. Thus, the investment strategy that domestic investors adopt in emerging markets is 
generally firm-performance oriented.  
This study therefore aims to make several contributions to the debate on ownership 
preferences across the world. The empirical results that link firm characteristics, information 
environments, and country institutions to both foreign and domestic investors expand the limited 
evidence on international portfolio allocation. In the literature, this study is most closely related 
to Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), Aggarwal et al. (2005), and Ferreira and Matos (2008), 
which are examples of similar line of inquiries but with single aims. Dahlquist and Robertsson 
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use firms in Sweden from 1991 to 1997 to investigate foreign and domestic investors’ portfolio 
preferences. Aggarwal et al. use U.S. mutual funds and focus on emerging markets with one year 
of data. Ferreira and Matos use overall institutional investors from 2000 to 2005 to test domestic 
and foreign investors’ portfolio preferences across all countries.  
This study takes a first look at foreign and domestic mutual funds’ holdings across 28 
countries from 1998 to 2007 by comparing portfolio preferences of foreign and domestic mutual 
funds in both developed and emerging markets. In addition, data contain mutual funds from 62 
countries, not just from the U.S.1 Second, this study adds to a growing body of papers that 
examine international portfolio allocation. Foreign investors have different portfolio preferences 
from domestic investors. In addition, both foreign and domestic mutual funds have different 
preferences toward firms in developed and emerging markets. Results also provide some 
additional information for researchers to solve the puzzle of home or foreign bias. The country’s 
institutions play important role on mutual fund holding decisions. Finally, this study is one of the 
few studies that investigate the effective monitoring role of institutional investors in the 
international markets. Only domestic mutual funds play an effective monitoring role on firms in 
both developed and emerging markets. The reason may be that foreign investors face more 
information disadvantages in emerging markets than in developed markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and variables 
employed in the empirical tests, along with summary statistics. Section 3 presents the firm-level 
empirical results while in section 4 we evaluate the impact of country-level institutions on 
foreign and domestic mutual fund portfolio decisions. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data and Sample Description 
In this section, we briefly describe the construction of sample and report summary statistics of 
key variables. The main sample comprises the following data sources: worldwide mutual fund 
holdings from Thomson Reuters; stock returns and financial variables from Datastream and 
                                                     
1 U.S.-based foreign institutions hold more than US$ 2 trillion, non-U.S. foreign institutions hold US$ 1.7 trillion, 
and domestic institutions hold US$ 1.5 trillion in non-U.S. stocks. Ferreira and Matos document that U.S.-based 




Worldscope; accounting standards from COMPUSTAT Global; and analyst information from 
I/B/E/S.  
The Thomson Reuters database contains mutual fund equity holdings information at the firm 
level for over 32,031 mutual funds worldwide. The portfolio holdings data include the 
identifications of funds and securities, and the number of shares held in a firm by each fund.2 We 
require sample firms to have an assigned SEDOL code from COMPUSTAT Global from 1998 to 
2007. There are 92,747 firm-year observations. However, the sample sizes in the multivariate 
analyses vary and are lower due to missing values for some variables. To classify fund holdings 
into domestic and foreign holdings, we check whether the funds and the holding firms are from 
the same countries. If both fund and firm are from the same country, the fund holdings are 
classified as domestic ownership; otherwise, foreign ownership applies.   
We further split national markets into developed and emerging markets. There are 28 
countries, 28,602 foreign mutual funds, 23,373 domestic mutual funds, and hence 92,747 firm-
years in our sample over 1998 to 2007. The large number of worldwide mutual funds offers a 
common platform to analyze the investment decisions of a homogenous group of institutional 
investors who share the same investment savvy. Their investment decisions should offer the 
subtle yet important attitude that mutual funds have towards firms in developed and emerging 
markets. We first investigate the overall portfolio preference of domestic and foreign mutual 
funds, followed by the portfolio preference of domestic and foreign mutual funds for each of 
developed and emerging markets. Portfolio preferences include firm characteristics, firms’ 
information environments, and country-level institutions. We also test whether foreign and 
domestic investors play an effective monitoring role on firms. Analyses provide several new and 
interesting results. 
Drawing from the existing literature, firm characteristics in our regressions include: firm 
size (Size), book-to-market ratio (BM), stock return (Ret12), stock return volatility (σRet), dividend 
yield (DY), return on equity (ROE), a dummy variable (MSCI) that takes the value of one if the 
firm is included in the MSCI index for a given year, debt to asset ratio (DA), cash holdings 
(CASH), closely-held ownership (CHold), sales growth (gSales), a dummy indicator (ADR) that 
                                                     
2 See Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) for a detailed description of the Thomson Reuters’ mutual fund holdings 
database. 
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equals one if a firm has issued American Depositary Receipts, and firm age (Age). Size is the log 
of market capitalization at year-end. BM is the log of book-to-market equity ratio in June of year 
t. Ret12 is the average of monthly stock returns over year t-1. σRet is the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over year t-1. DA is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. CASH is the 
ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. CHold is the fraction of shares closely 
held by insiders and controlling shareholders in year t. gSales is the average of sales growth for 
years t-2 and t-1.  
To assess the effect of firm-level information environment on foreign mutual fund 
ownership, firms’ information measures include accounting standards (AccStd), analyst coverage 
(Nanalysts), forecast dispersion (Disp), forecast errors (Ferror), accruals (Accrual), earnings 
smoothing (Smooth), and earnings correlation (Corr). These variables evaluate three dimensions 
of information disclosure quality at the firm level. AccStd evaluates accounting standards; 
Nanlysts, Disp, and Ferror are related to the information disclosed by analysts. Accrual, Smooth, 
and Corr measure the earnings management. AccStd is a dummy variable set to one if the firm 
uses GAAP or IAS as its accounting standard. Nanalysts is the number of financial analysts 
covering a firm in year t. Disp is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts scaled by the mean 
of analyst forecasts in year t. Ferror is the absolute value of the difference between announced 
earnings and the mean of estimated earnings scaled by the mean of analyst forecasts in year t. 
Accrual is the magnitude of accruals. We follow Lai, Ng and Zhang (2012) to calculate the 
variable of Accrual. Smooth is the smoothness of the accounting reports and is the ratio of the 
standard deviation of operating income to the standard deviation of cash flows over the last five 
years. Corr is the correlation coefficient between change of accruals and change of cash flows 
over the last five years. When calculating Smooth and Corr, a minimum of three years is required.  
Country characteristics included in the analyses are GDP per capita (GDP), stock market 
capitalization to GDP (MCAP), GDP growth (gGDP), trade to GDP ratio (TGDP), GDP growth 
volatility (σGDP), and stock market volatility (σMKT). All variables except stock market 
volatility are taken from the World Development Indicators. To access country-level information 
on disclosure or institutions, we implement indexes from La Porta et al. (1998, 2006). These 
indicators include security regulations, the accounting standard index, and the anti-self-dealing 
index. The index for disclosure requirements is from World Economic Forum. Median of the 
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index scores across all countries is used to classify countries. Countries with score above the 
median are considered strongly regulated countries; otherwise they are considered weakly 
regulated countries. 
 Table 1: Country-level sample distribution and descriptive statistics 
This table reports the time-series averages of country characteristics for 28 countries from 1998 
to 2007, together with the number of firm-year observations (N(FYear)) covered in the sample 
and the fraction of shares held by foreign mutual funds (MF) in %. Country characteristics 
include GDP per capita (GDP), stock market capitalization to GDP (MCAP), GDP growth 
(gGDP) in year t-1, trade to GDP ratio (TGDP) in year t, GDP growth volatility (σGDP) over the 
last five years, and daily stock market volatility (σMKT) over year t-1. 
 
Country N(FYear) MF GDP MCAP gGDP TGDP σGDP σMKT 
Argentina 475 0.92 8.94 0.47 0.02 0.33 0.06 0.29 
Australia 5,165 2.60 10.01 1.12 0.03 0.41 0.01 0.17 
Austria 741 5.05 10.11 0.30 0.02 0.97 0.01 0.15 
Belgium 1,443 2.24 10.05 0.77 0.02 1.63 0.01 0.17 
Brazil 2,230 2.17 8.24 0.42 0.03 0.24 0.02 0.31 
Denmark 1,209 2.66 10.33 0.64 0.02 0.89 0.01 0.17 
Finland 1,185 6.20 10.12 1.46 0.04 0.74 0.01 0.31 
France 5,287 3.33 10.04 0.90 0.02 0.53 0.01 0.19 
Germany 5,422 3.96 10.06 0.52 0.02 0.71 0.01 0.19 
Greece 1,688 1.46 9.61 0.62 0.04 0.47 0.01 0.22 
Hong Kong 1,838 2.29 10.20 4.93 0.04 3.23 0.04 0.21 
India 3,660 2.51 6.27 0.56 0.07 0.37 0.02 0.26 
Italy 2,756 2.79 9.87 0.51 0.01 0.52 0.01 0.18 
Japan 20,984 1.67 10.54 0.84 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.21 
Mexico 1,039 2.47 8.69 0.26 0.03 0.61 0.03 0.23 
Malaysia 3,487 1.56 8.31 1.50 0.05 2.16 0.04 0.20 
Netherlands 1,801 5.79 10.10 1.22 0.02 1.29 0.01 0.18 
Norway 1,259 4.06 10.57 0.54 0.03 0.73 0.01 0.22 
New Zealand 691 3.07 9.58 0.41 0.03 0.61 0.02 0.16 
Portugal 487 2.24 9.30 0.47 0.02 0.67 0.01 0.16 
South Africa 1,625 2.01 8.08 1.98 0.04 0.56 0.01 0.25 
Singapore 2,427 2.13 10.08 2.04 0.06 4.28 0.04 0.19 
Spain 1,345 2.95 9.61 0.84 0.04 0.57 0.01 0.19 
Sweden 2,553 3.82 10.26 1.20 0.03 0.86 0.01 0.25 
Switzerland 2,459 4.61 10.45 2.66 0.02 0.84 0.01 0.16 
Thailand 3,548 1.86 7.73 0.56 0.04 1.30 0.05 0.29 
Taiwan 4,367 2.36 9.58 1.24 0.03 1.14 0.06 0.25 
United Kingdom 11,576 2.42 10.16 1.53 0.03 0.57 0.01 0.17 




Table 1 is a summary on 28 countries, their characteristics, and the number of firm-years 
covered in each country. The number of firm-year observations varies substantially across 
countries with 20,984 firm-years in Japan, 11,576 firm-years in the U.K., 5,422 firm-years in 
Germany, and only 475 firm-years in Argentina. Average foreign mutual fund holdings are 
generally higher for developed markets than for emerging markets, ranging from 0.92 per cent 
for Argentina to 6.20 per cent for Finland. Among the 28 countries in the sample, Norway, Hong 
Kong, India, Singapore, Taiwan, and Brazil have the greatest value of GDP, stock market size, 
GDP growth rate, trade to GDP ratio, GDP growth volatility, and market return volatility, 
respectively. However, India, Mexico, Italy, Japan, and Austria have the lowest value of GDP, 
stock market size, GDP growth rate, trade to GDP ratio, and stock market return volatility, 
respectively.  
 Table 2: Firm-level sample istribution and descriptive statistics 
This table reports the time-series averages of firm characteristics from 1998 to 2007, together 
with the number of firm-year observations (N(FYear)) covered in the sample. Firm 
characteristics include the fraction of shares held by foreign mutual funds (MF) in %, log of 
market capitalization (Size), log of book-to-market ratio (BM), average of past one-year monthly 
stock returns (Ret12), standard deviation of past one year monthly stock returns (σRet), dividend 
yield (DY), return on equity ratio (ROE), MSCI membership (MSCI), debt to asset ratio (DA), 
cash holdings (CASH), closely-held ownership (CHold), sales growth (gSales), ADR issuance 
(ADR), and firm age (AGE). 
 
 Mean N(FYear) Median Std. dev. 
MF 2.57 90,006 0.55 5.52 
SIZE 5.64 73,529 5.51 1.90 
BM -0.48 70,311 -0.41 0.88 
Ret12 0.01 73,503 0.01 0.05 
σRet 0.13 73,463 0.11 0.09 
DY 0.02 69,622 0.02 0.03 
ROE 0.06 67,848 0.08 0.25 
MSCI 0.46 73,907 0.00 0.50 
DA 0.23 69,392 0.17 0.23 
CASH 0.15 65,889 0.10 0.16 
CHold 0.43 63,301 0.42 0.23 
gSales 1.15 68,406 1.07 0.47 
ADR 0.04 73,907 0.00 0.19 





Table 2 reports the distribution of variables at the firm level across all countries employed in 
the analyses. Foreign mutual funds hold an average of 2.57 per cent of shares for the 90,006 total 
firm-year observations. Around 4 per cent of the firms have issued ADR, and around 46 per cent 
of the firms are members of MSCI index. Closely-held ownership applies to an average of 43 per 
cent of the shares. Firms in the sample generally have a negative BM and a positive past return. 
They also pay dividends and have a sales growth rate of 15 per cent. In an unreported table, the 
correlations between variables in the sample are moderately low, suggesting that the problem of 
multicollinearity should be minor. 
 
3. Determinants of Mutual Fund Holdings at the Firm Level 
Previous literature shows that U.S.-based foreign investors usually prefer firms with better 
information disclosure or firms that are more visible to foreigners such as large firms, firms with 
ADR issuance, and MSCI member countries. One explanation is that foreign investors suffer 
from an information disadvantage. Therefore, foreign and domestic investors should have some 
different portfolio preferences if foreign and domestic investors possess different levels of 
private information about local firms. In this section, we report findings on firm-level 
determinants of portfolio preferences across all countries for foreign and domestic mutual funds. 
Following this are the firm characteristics for each developed and emerging market for both 
foreign and domestic mutual funds. Determinants include firm characteristics and information 
environment.  
3.1 What Attracts Foreign and Domestic Mutual Funds? 
We first present results on which firm characteristics mutual fund investors care about the 
most. In this test, we control for country fixed effects and year fixed effects, and all associated t-
statistics are calculated based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and firm-level 
clustering. Therefore, firm characteristics across countries in the regressions should be 
comparable.  
Table 3 is a summary of results. In the first column of left panel, the foreign mutual fund  
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Table 3: Tobit regression results of foreign and domestic mutual fund ownership  
on firm characteristics 
 
This table reports the regression results of mutual fund ownership on various firm characteristics 
with t-statistics of the coefficient estimates in parentheses. In the three models on the left side, 
the dependent variable is foreign mutual fund ownership. Results are first reported by including 
all countries, followed by developed countries, and lastly emerging countries. In the three models 
on the right, the dependent variable is domestic mutual fund ownership. Firm characteristics 
include variables described in Table 2. The sample period is from 1998 to 2007. Year and country 
dummies are added to control for year and country effects, and clustered standard errors are 
corrected at the firm level. N(FYear) is the number of firm-year observations. 
 
 Foreign Mutual Funds  Domestic Mutual Funds 
VARIABLES All Developed Emerging  All Developed Emerging 
SIZE 0.83 0.82 0.96  -0.03 -0.03 -0.11 
 (25.48) (23.19) (9.94)  (-1.09) (-0.73) (-1.45) 
BM -0.30 -0.21 -0.56  -0.62 -0.58 -0.80 
 (-5.70) (-3.45) (-4.98)  (-9.80) (-8.32) (-5.20) 
Ret12 -5.41 -5.37 -4.95  -2.19 -4.89 6.85 
 (-8.14) (-6.86) (-3.75)  (-3.01) (-5.66) (5.13) 
σRet 2.39 3.02 0.22  2.29 2.27 -0.40 
 (4.88) (5.28) (0.24)  (3.82) (3.01) (-0.45) 
DY -2.82 -3.65 -1.94  0.96 -1.32 5.06 
 (-2.97) (-3.28) (-1.00)  (0.78) (-0.92) (2.20) 
ROE 0.54 0.39 1.33  1.52 1.43 2.06 
 (3.64) (2.41) (3.73)  (9.00) (7.50) (6.37) 
MSCI 0.55 0.54 0.55  -0.47 -0.35 -0.76 
 (5.98) (5.24) (2.54)  (-4.40) (-2.80) (-3.64) 
DA 0.07 0.07 0.34  0.23 0.17 0.60 
 (0.39) (0.34) (0.71)  (1.06) (0.65) (1.61) 
CASH 1.38 1.23 1.60  -0.60 -0.74 -0.08 
 (5.01) (4.02) (2.44)  (-2.19) (-2.41) (-0.13) 
CHold -3.70 -3.79 -3.67  -3.47 -3.31 -3.95 
 (-18.21) (-16.19) (-8.49)  (-18.05) (-14.89) (-10.50) 
gSales x100 -0.01 -0.02 0.17  0.02 0.01 0.12 
 (-1.00) (-1.09) (4.90)  (0.60) (0.53) (2.61) 
ADR 0.56 0.50 0.76  -1.36 -1.25 -1.68 
 (1.99) (1.78) (0.92)  (-7.01) (-5.62) (-4.47) 
AGE  -0.05 -0.04 -0.06  -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 
 (-9.93) (-9.27) (-3.29)  (-7.45) (-6.62) (-4.84) 
        
N(FYear) 52,830 42,876 9,954  50,858 40,320 10,538 




holdings are mainly positive and statistically significantly related to firm size, ROE, MSCI 
membership, cash holdings, and ADR issuance. 
Results indicate that firms with more information disclosure and better visibility attract more 
foreign investors, for example, large firms, firms with MSCI membership, and firms with ADR 
issuance. The results further demonstrate that foreign ownership is negatively associated with 
book-to-market ratio, dividend yields, closely-held shares, and firm age. Thus, foreign investors 
prefer growth stocks, low dividend payouts, less closely-held shares, and younger firms. 
Consistent with Ferreira and Matos (2008), domestic mutual funds (the first column of right 
panel) generally show a lower preference toward large firms, firms with ADR issuance, or firms 
listed in the MSCI index. They also prefer firms with lower cash holdings. Since domestic 
investors have more information about local firms, they rely less on firm size to make their 
investment decisions. Similar to foreign investors, domestic mutual funds show preference 
toward growth stocks, better ROE, less closely-held shares, and younger firms.   
When countries are separated into developed and emerging markets, foreign investors’ 
portfolio preferences in developed markets are generally consistent with their overall portfolio 
preferences across all countries. Contrary to the portfolio preferences for foreign investors in 
developed markets, foreign investors in emerging markets focus more on operating performance, 
such as strong ROE and sales growth. Dividend yield also plays no role in foreign mutual fund 
ownership. Similar to foreign mutual funds, domestic mutual funds have some significantly 
different portfolio preferences for firms in developed and emerging markets. For example, 
domestic mutual funds in the emerging markets do not care about cash holdings but prefer firms 
that pay more dividends. It is interesting to note that ADR issuance has almost no effect on 
foreign fund holdings in the emerging markets. There are two possible explanations: (i) the 
number of ADR listings may be low in the emerging markets (Aggarwal et al., 2005), and (ii) the 
data include all mutual funds worldwide, and ADRs have less effect on foreign mutual funds 
from countries other than the U.S.  
3.2 Information Disclosure Quality and Mutual Fund Holding Preference 
Next set of results are on disclosure affects in both foreign and domestic mutual fund 
holdings in developed and emerging markets. In this test, three dimensions of information 
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disclosure are used – accounting standards, analyst variables, and earnings management – to 
measure a firm’s information environment.  
To conduct the test, a dummy is set to one if the firm uses IAS or GAAP as its accounting 
standard. In the accounting literature, both accounting standards and auditor quality matter most 
for the quality of financial reports and foreign investors (see Bradshaw, Bushee, and Miller, 2004; 
Francis, 2004; Covrig, DeFond, and Hung, 2007). However, as Francis and Wang (2008) 
document, COMPUSTAT Global does not give proper auditor identification for Japan, South 
Korea, India, and Pakistan. In addition, there is no precise way to determine the auditors’ 
identification in these four countries. Therefore, this study focuses on accounting standards to 
measure the reliability, consistency and comparability of accounting information for a firm. To 
measure the information delivered by financial analysts for a firm, we implement the number of 
analysts covering the firm, analyst forecast dispersion, and analyst forecast errors. The 
magnitude of accruals, earnings smoothing, and the correlation between change in accruals and 
change in operating cash flows are the measures for earnings management. To test the relation 
between information disclosure and mutual fund holdings, and to see what measures have the 
most significant effects, each category of information measures (accounting standards, financial 
analysts, and earnings management) is included one by one in order to avoid the problems of 
reduced observations and collinearity between any two categories of measures. 
Table 4 reports the results. It is obvious that accounting standards and information provided 
by analysts both play a major role on mutual funds investment decisions. When a firm adopts 
better accounting standards, foreign and domestic mutual funds will increase their holdings in the 
firm by 0.76 per cent and 0.54 per cent, respectively. This is economically significant. From 
Table 2, the average foreign mutual fund holding is 2.57 per cent. Thus, an increase of 0.76 per 
cent for foreign shares is representative of 30 per cent increase in ownership. The effect of better 
accounting standards on foreign mutual fund ownership is stronger in developed markets but 
reduces in emerging markets. This indicates that emerging markets lack enforcement, which 
weakens the link between better accounting standards and foreign holdings (Francis and Wang, 
2008). However, better accounting standards have a more significant impact on domestic mutual 
fund investment decisions in emerging markets than in developed markets. This may imply that 
domestic investors have an information advantage over foreign investors.  
61 
 
Table 4: Information disclosure quality and mutual fund holding preference 
 
This table reports the regression results of mutual fund ownership on various measures for firm-
level information disclosure. Measures of a firm’s information environment are categorized in 
the following three ways. (i) Accounting standards: A dummy for the firm’s accounting standards 
(AccStd) that equals one if the firm uses IAS or GAAP as its accounting standard; (ii) Analyst 
variables, the number of analysts covering the firm (Nanalysts), analyst forecast dispersion 
(Disp), and analyst forecast errors (Ferror); (iii) Degree of earnings management: The magnitude 
of accruals (Accrual), earnings smoothing (Smooth), and correlation between the change in 
accruals and change in operating cash flows (Corr).  Control variables include variables used in 
Table 3. t-statistics reported in parentheses are calculated based on clustered firm-level 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. N(FYear) is the number of firm-year observations. 
The sample period is from 1998 to 2007. Year and country dummies are added to control for year 
and country effects. 
 
 All Countries Developed Market Emerging Market 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Panel A: Foreign Mutual Funds 
Nanalysts  0.09   0.08   0.19  
  (7.36)   (5.82)   (5.16)  
Disp  -0.41   -0.38   -0.60  
  (-2.50)   (-2.18)   (-1.25)  
Ferror  -0.01   -0.01   -0.04  
  (-0.25)   (-0.14)   (-0.47)  
AccStd 0.76   0.82   0.78   
 (5.18)   (5.30)   (1.71)   
Accrual   -0.03   -0.06   0.08 
   (-0.68)   (-1.34)   (0.75) 
Smooth   0.02   0.06   -0.22 
   (0.28)   (0.62)   (-1.42) 
Corr   -0.17   -0.20   -0.11 
   (-1.64)   (-1.65)   (-0.49) 
          
N(FYear) 41,766 33,313 43,670 34,436 27,629 35,588 7,330 5,684 8,082 
Pseudo R2 4.40% 4.63% 4.43% 4.67% 4.81% 4.71% 4.08% 4.28% 3.99% 
 
 All Countries Developed Market Emerging Market 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Panel B: Domestic Mutual Funds 
Nanalysts  0.05   0.04   0.09  
  (5.87)   (4.50)   (4.17)  
Disp  -0.87   -0.79   -0.94  
  (-5.30)   (-4.37)   (-2.49)  
Ferror  0.00   0.00   -0.05  
  (-0.06)   (-0.07)   (-0.54)  
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AccStd 0.54   0.41   1.07   
 (3.75)   (2.58)   (3.20)   
Accrual   -0.07   -0.09   0.00 
   (-1.58)   (-1.63)   (0.04) 
Smooth   0.09   0.04   0.25 
   (1.11)   (0.43)   (1.50) 
Corr   -0.02   -0.06   0.22 
   (-0.15)   (-0.44)   (1.09) 
          
N(FYear) 40,108 32,136 41,252 32,199 26,684 33,199 7,909 5,452 8,053 
Pseudo R2 3.91% 4.16% 3.85% 4.16% 4.39% 4.06% 2.85% 3.37% 2.73% 
 
Therefore, the lack of enforcement does not affect domestic mutual funds.  
Among analyst variables, the number of analysts and analyst forecast dispersion are 
positively and negatively associated with the investment decisions of both foreign and domestic 
mutual funds, respectively. These two variables are significant at conventional levels. However, 
the significance of analyst forecast dispersion in emerging markets reduces for foreign investors. 
Analysts’ forecast errors have the least effect on investment decisions for domestic and foreign 
mutual funds. This may show that visibility is more important than information quality for 
mutual funds because higher analyst coverage indicates that the firm is more visible and provides 
more information to investors. It is also possible that investors have difficulty judging the 
accuracy of information so the correlation between fund ownership and forecast errors is not 
significant. Among all three earnings management measures, none of them has a significant 
effect on foreign or domestic holdings. These results are consistent between foreign and 
domestic mutual funds. 
 
4. Determinants of Mutual Fund Holdings at the Country Level 
This section is on how country characteristics affect foreign and domestic mutual fund ownership. 
Previous literature documents that a country’s information disclosure quality and its institutions 
both affect foreign investors’ intention to enter the stock market. For example, Leuz, Nanda, and 
Wysocki (2003) show that information quality is poor for firms in countries with weak investor 
protection. Gelos and Wei (2005) and Leuz et al. (2009) show that low country information 
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transparency or information disclosure quality reduces foreign investment and is likely to 
exacerbate the degree of information asymmetry faced by foreign investors. Therefore, foreign 
mutual funds’ ownership varies with the countries’ institutions and information disclosure quality. 
However, it is not clear whether such country characteristics affect domestic mutual funds’ 
investment decisions. This study first examines how a country’s characteristics affect both 
foreign and domestic mutual fund ownership. Then, we test how mutual funds’ ownership varies 
with a country’s information disclosure. Lastly, we test whether foreign or domestic mutual 
funds play an effective role on monitoring. 
4.1 Country Characteristics and Mutual Fund Holdings 
Here, country characteristics included in the test are a dummy variable to indicate emerging 
market, GDP, stock market capitalization to GDP, GDP growth, ratio of trade (exports plus 
imports) to GDP, standard deviation of annual GDP growth over the past five years, and the 
annualized standard deviation of daily stock market returns over the past one year. The 
dependent variable is mutual fund ownership in percent at the firm level. Control variables 
include all firm-level characteristics used in Table 3. t-statistics are reported with clustered firm-
level heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. Table 5 reports the results. 
From the left panel of Table 5, it is clear that foreign mutual funds invest less in emerging 
markets. If all conditions are equal, foreign investors reduce their ownership by an average of 
1.40% in emerging markets when compared with developed markets. All variables except trade 
to GDP and stock market volatility are negatively related to foreign ownership. Thus, foreign 
investors actually invest less in big countries and this is caused by the diversification needs for 
foreign investors (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). International trading seems to be an important 
factor for attracting foreign capital. If a country has a stronger connection with other countries, 
foreign investors tend to invest more in this country. The portfolio preference is similar for 
foreign investors in both developed and emerging markets except when considering GDP, GDP 
growth volatility, and stock market volatility. The coefficients of GDP, GDP growth volatility, 
and stock market volatility become insignificant in emerging markets for foreign investors.  
For domestic mutual funds (right panel of Table 5), there is no difference in fund ownership 
between developed and emerging markets. Contrary to foreign investors, domestic mutual funds’ 
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ownership is positively related to market size and negatively related to trade to  
Table 5: Tobit regression results on mutual fund ownership on country characteristics 
 
This table reports regression results of foreign and domestic mutual fund ownership on various 
country characteristics. Country variables include EmeD that is equal to one if the country is an 
emerging country, GDP per capita (GDP), stock market capitalization to GDP (MCAP), GDP 
growth, ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (TGDP), standard deviation of annual GDP growth 
over past five years (σGDP), and the annualized standard deviation of daily stock market returns 
over year t-1 (σMKT). Control variables include firm-level variables used in Table 3. t-statistics 
reported in parentheses are calculated based on clustered firm-level heteroskedasticity-adjusted 
standard errors. N(FYear) is the number of firm-year observations. The sample period is from 
1998 to 2007. Year dummies are added to control for year effect. 
 
 Foreign Mutual Funds   Domestic Mutual Funds 
 All Developed Emerging   All Developed Emerging 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
EmeD -1.40     -0.38   
 (-6.51)     (-1.67)   
GDP -0.38 -1.67 -0.09   -0.44 -0.59 -0.27 
 (-4.44) (-7.02) (-0.92)   (-5.14) (-2.41) (-2.76) 
MCAP -0.25 -0.16 -0.40   0.81 0.55 1.56 
 (-3.53) (-2.09) (-1.91)   (11.78) (8.36) (5.89) 
gGDP -9.80 -19.85 -5.09   2.99 15.54 -4.96 
 (-5.48) (-6.36) (-2.40)   (1.62) (4.66) (-1.86) 
TGDP 0.76 0.91 0.59   -0.37 0.73 -1.95 
 (9.85) (8.28) (3.29)   (-5.63) (7.25) (-13.58) 
σGDP -9.79 -31.37 -3.51   -51.10 -175.56 -8.91 
 (-3.64) (-5.15) (-0.96)   (-15.74) (-22.05) (-2.52) 
σMKT 1.83 5.83 -0.83   1.01 1.65 0.52 
 (2.50) (4.73) (-0.96)   (1.48) (1.35) (0.52) 
         
N(FYear) 52,527 42,573 9,954   50,637 40,099 10,538 
Pseudo R2 3.44% 3.67% 3.40%   2.19% 2.53% 2.64% 
 
GDP. It is reasonable that the size of equity market is positively related to domestic fund 
ownership because market size in general is associated with local people’s wealth. Since foreign 
ownership is positively related to trade to GDP, the negative correlation between domestic 
ownership and trade to GDP indicates that well-known countries attract more foreign investors 
and this causes domestic investors to have a small fraction of ownership. The finding from 
emerging markets supports this argument because firms in emerging markets on average are 
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smaller than firms in developed markets. An increased foreign ownership in emerging markets 
will lead to a significant drop in domestic ownership.  
4.2 Country Institutions and Mutual Fund Holdings 
This subsection provides results on how country-level institutions affect investors’ decision 
making when they form their portfolio holdings. Previous literature documents that countries’ 
laws and disclosure quality affect foreign investors’ intention to enter a market or to hold a firm’s 
stock (Gelos and Wei, 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Leuz et al., 2009). Here, we use security 
regulation to proxy for the enforcement of security laws, disclosure requirement to proxy for a 
country’s disclosure quality, accounting standard to proxy for the countries’ financial disclosure 
quality, and anti-self-dealing to proxy for the quality of corporate governance in the country. 
These factors are supposed to be positively related to foreign mutual fund ownership. However, 
the effect of these factors on mutual fund ownership is still not clear when markets are further 
split into developed and emerging markets, and funds are grouped into foreign and domestic 
mutual funds. 
Table 6 first reports the results by using foreign mutual funds as the sample in Panel A and 
then by using domestic mutual funds as the sample in Panel B. It is obvious that a country’s 
institutions matter to foreign investors in both developed and emerging markets. However, the 
effect of institutions seems to be stronger in developed markets than in emerging markets except 
for security regulations. One possible explanation for this is that developed countries have better 
abilities to fairly enforce laws. Among all institutional variables, disclosure requirements have 
the greatest effect on foreign holdings, while security regulations, accounting standard and anti-
self-dealing are all important to foreign investors. Thus, to attract foreign capital, emerging 
countries have to improve their institutions to protect investors and provide quality information 
disclosure. 
Contrary to foreign investors, domestic mutual funds have different behaviors in both 
developed and emerging markets. When all countries are pooled together, domestic mutual funds 
seem to not care about security regulations and accounting standard. However, disclosure 
requirements and anti-self-dealing are still important for domestic mutual funds. Since domestic 
mutual funds know local firms better, information asymmetry is less of a problem when they  
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Table 6: Country institutions and mutual fund holding preference 
 
This table reports regression results of mutual fund ownership on various measures for country-level information disclosure. The 
dependent variable is the foreign or domestic mutual fund ownership in all markets, developed markets, and emerging markets. The 
measures for information disclosure quality at the country level include dummies for security regulations, disclosure requirements, 
accounting standards index, and anti-self-dealing index. See La Porta et al. (2006) for the description of the indexes. The dummy for 
each country disclosure measure is equal to one if the country has an index score above the median of all countries. Control variables 
include country variables used in Table 5 and firm variables used in Table 3. t-statistics reported in parentheses are calculated based on 
clustered firm-level heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. N(FYear) is the number of firm-year observations. The sample period 
is from 1998 to 2007. Year and country dummies are added to control for year and country effects. 
 
 All Countries  Developed Markets  Emerging Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Panel A: Foreign Mutual Funds 
Security Regulation 0.44     0.83     1.05    
 (3.59)     (5.55)     (2.52)    
Disclosure 
Requirement  2.06   
 
 2.23   
 
 1.05   
  
(14.35




)   
 
 (2.52)   
Accounting Standard   0.93     0.93     0.57  
   (6.48)     (4.71)     (1.84)  
Anti-self-dealing    1.93     2.06     1.05 








   (2.52) 







    
 
    











9,954 9,954 9,954 9,954 
Pseudo R2 3.44% 3.68% 3.54% 3.72% 
 












Table 6 (Continued) 
 
 All Countries  Developed Markets  Emerging Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Panel B: Domestic Mutual Funds 
Security Regulation -1.42     -1.29     4.25    
 
(-
11.29)    
 (-
9.19)    
 
(9.58)    
Disclosure 
Requirement  1.51   
 
 0.73   
 
 4.25   
  
(11.34
)   
 
 (4.55)   
 
 (9.58)   
Accounting Standard   -0.06     -1.56     4.01  











Anti-self-dealing    0.57     -0.08     4.25 
    (4.74) 
 




   (9.58) 
Emerging Market -0.20 -0.71 -0.39 -0.47           






    
 
    
               



















Pseudo R2 2.32% 2.32% 2.19% 2.21%  2.62% 2.56% 2.61% 2.53%  3.04% 3.04% 2.98% 3.04% 
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make investment decisions. When countries are separated into developed and emerging markets, 
domestic investors demonstrate different weights on the country’s institutions. In developed 
countries, domestic investors care less about accounting standard and security regulations.  
They also pay less attention to anti-self-dealing. It is worth noting that all institutions play a 
significant role on the domestic investors’ decision making in the emerging markets. Although 
domestic investors possess more information of local firms, they still value the quality of laws 
and information disclosure at the country level. Therefore, good institutions not only attract more 
foreign capital, but also stimulate local people to invest in emerging market. 
4.3 Governance Role of Mutual Funds 
Ferreira and Matos (2008) document that mutual funds and independent investment advisors 
are likely to play a governance role because they have fewer connections with their holding 
companies and therefore the monitoring costs will be lower. From previous sections, foreign 
investors and domestic investors have different portfolio preferences in developed and emerging 
markets. Hence, it is interesting to see whether foreign and domestic investors can monitor firms 
effectively. In this subsection, we use return on assets (ROA) instead of firm value to test 
whether mutual funds play a monitoring role. As Ferreira and Matos document, firm value and 
foreign ownership may be endogenously determined because higher firm value may attract more 
foreign investors and foreign investors push up the price, which causes a high firm value. Using 
ROA as a proxy for firm performance is a better way to disentangle the monitoring effect of 
institutional investors. 
Table 7 reports the results by regressing firms’ ROA on foreign ownership or domestic 
ownership with control variables. Control variables include the entire firm characteristics used in 
Table 3. Year and country dummies are also added to control for year and country effects. From 
the results, it is obvious that both foreign and domestic mutual funds play a monitoring role on 
firms. Firm operating performance is positively associated with fund ownership. Particularly, 
domestic mutual funds seem to be a more effective monitor. For foreign mutual funds, funds’ 
ownership is related to higher ROA in developed countries but the relation becomes insignificant 
in emerging countries. This indicates that foreign investors have difficulties to play an effective 





Table 7: Operating performance and mutual fund ownership 
This table reports the regression results of return on assets (ROA) on foreign and domestic 
mutual fund ownership in all markets, developed markets, and emerging markets. Control 
variables include variables used in Table 3. t-statistics reported in parentheses are calculated 
based on clustered firm-level heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors. N(FYear) is the number 
of firm-year observations. The sample period is from 1998 to 2007. Year and country dummies 
are added to control for year and country effects. 
 
 Foreign Mutual Funds  Domestic Mutual Funds 
VARIABLES All Developed Emerging  All Developed Emerging 
MF 0.03 0.03 0.01  0.05 0.05 0.09 
 (2.80) (3.14) (0.46)  (5.14) (3.97) (4.68) 
SIZE 0.32 0.29 0.22  0.33 0.31 0.30 
 (6.60) (5.29) (2.23)  (6.82) (5.66) (2.76) 
BM -0.89 -0.83 -1.70  -0.84 -0.77 -1.66 
 (-6.92) (-5.52) (-8.08)  (-6.30) (-4.84) (-8.42) 
Ret12 18.62 20.71 12.70  17.12 18.67 10.99 
 (10.06) (9.03) (6.24)  (8.98) (7.74) (5.29) 
σRet -16.65 -21.68 -1.49  -16.62 -20.59 -3.87 
 (-9.49) (-10.44) (-0.86)  (-8.98) (-8.58) (-1.87) 
DY 26.83 25.70 31.55  25.54 25.06 31.06 
 (10.29) (8.21) (7.07)  (9.70) (7.60) (7.32) 
ROE 28.71 29.44 22.08  31.12 32.00 23.12 
 (40.22) (36.85) (18.38)  (43.05) (39.40) (21.31) 
MSCI -0.25 -0.13 -0.02  -0.48 -0.33 -0.25 
 (-1.96) (-0.90) (-0.07)  (-3.56) (-2.12) (-0.93) 
DA -0.69 -0.61 -2.36  -1.09 -1.06 -2.64 
 (-2.42) (-1.86) (-4.44)  (-3.69) (-3.08) (-5.40) 
CASH -3.25 -4.29 6.21  -3.77 -5.01 6.36 
 (-4.68) (-5.57) (6.02)  (-5.42) (-6.43) (6.77) 
CHold 1.36 1.85 -0.02  1.12 1.60 0.24 
 (5.03) (5.93) (-0.04)  (3.76) (4.54) (0.52) 
gSales x100 0.03 0.03 -0.08  0.02 0.02 -0.10 
 (2.74) (2.85) (-2.82)  (1.27) (1.63) (-3.52) 
ADR -0.80 -0.76 -0.45  -0.35 -0.22 -0.42 
 (-2.66) (-2.29) (-0.73)  (-1.19) (-0.67) (-0.69) 
AGE  -0.01 -0.01 -0.08  0.01 0.00 -0.07 
 (-0.91) (-1.38) (-3.04)  (1.07) (0.37) (-2.96) 
        
        
N(FYear) 52,792 42,844 9,948  50,821 40,292 10,529 
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.51 0.51  0.54 0.53 0.53 
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fund ownership are all significant in both developed and emerging markets. This monitoring 
effect of domestic mutual funds is especially strong in emerging markets. 
Among all control variables, it is worth noting that size, past performance, dividend yields, 
and ROE are all positively associated with ROA. However, closely-held ownership has a positive 
effect on the ROA in developed countries, but the effect disappears in emerging markets. Results 
show that higher insider ownership does improve operating performance, but this relation only 
exists in developed countries. In the emerging markets, there is a lack of law enforcement to 
protect investors, resulting in higher monitoring costs for shareholders. Because the penalties 
from being caught by laws or sued by shareholders are relatively minor, firm managers in 
emerging markets with higher ownership may actually use their power to extract private benefits 
from shareholders and to deter shareholders from playing monitoring role. It is also widely 
documented that good corporate governance is enforced through lower cash holdings (see e.g., 
Yun, 2009). If this is the case, cash holdings should be negatively related to firm performance. As 
shown in Table 7, the coefficient of cash holdings is negative, except emerging markets. In the 
emerging markets, cash holdings have a positive effect on firm performance, implying that cash 
holdings may play a different role in developed and emerging markets. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates the portfolio preferences of foreign and domestic mutual funds in 
developed and emerging markets. The sample covers 28 countries, 28,602 foreign mutual funds, 
23,373 domestic mutual funds, and 92,747 firm-years from 1998 to 2007. Previous studies in 
general only use the sample from developed or emerging markets with one year of data. They 
also focus on foreign investors to explore the preferences of asset allocation. It is still unclear 
whether previous findings apply to both domestic and foreign investors and remain evident in 
either developed or emerging markets. The maintained hypothesis is that firms in different 
markets have different structures. Since foreign investors have information disadvantage in local 
markets, foreign and domestic investors should have different preferences when they form their 
portfolio holdings. This study uses both domestic and foreign mutual funds in developed and 
emerging markets to first investigate the overall portfolio preferences and then their portfolio 
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preferences in each market. 
Results show that foreign and domestic investors have some different portfolio preferences, 
and these preferences vary between developed and emerging markets. Foreign mutual funds in 
the developed markets prefer firms with large size, lower dividend yields, higher ROE, more 
cash holdings, and fewer closely-held shares. They also like young growth stocks, firms listed in 
the MSCI index, and firms that have ADR issuance. In emerging markets, they focus more on 
firms’ operating performance, such as ROE and sales growth, but less on ADR issuance. 
Contrary to foreign mutual funds, domestic mutual funds overall do not care about MSCI 
membership and ADR issuance. Firm size and dividend yields also play a small role in domestic 
mutual funds’ portfolio holdings. Such findings are consistent in developed markets. In emerging 
markets, domestic mutual funds place a greater emphasis on dividend yields, ROE, and sales 
growth. 
Firms’ information environments also affect both foreign and domestic mutual funds’ 
portfolio preferences. Three dimensions of measure – accounting standards, earnings 
management, and analyst variables – are utilized to proxy for the level of the firms’ information 
asymmetry. Results indicate that accounting standards and analyst-related measures are 
significantly related to fund ownership for both foreign and domestic mutual funds. However, the 
positive effect of strong accounting standards and lower analyst forecast dispersion reduces for 
foreign mutual funds in emerging markets but remains significant for domestic mutual funds. 
Among all measures, the number of analysts covering a firm is the most important.  
Results also would suggests that foreign mutual funds obviously invest less in emerging 
markets. Higher GDP, larger equity market size, and higher GDP growth exhibit negative effects 
and foreign trades have a positive effect on foreign mutual funds. For domestic mutual funds, 
ownership is positively related to stock market size and negatively related to foreign trades. To 
explore whether institutions affect fund managers’ intentions to invest, four measures are used: 
security regulation, disclosure requirement, accounting standard, and anti-self-dealing. Results 
show that all measures for a country’s institutions affect foreign mutual funds’ intentions to 
invest in firms in the country. The findings are consistent for both developed and emerging 
markets. However, domestic mutual funds only care about disclosure requirements in developed 
markets while all four measures matter in emerging markets. Further results show that both 
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foreign and domestic mutual funds are able to play a monitoring role for firms, but foreign 
mutual funds can only monitor firms effectively in developed markets. 
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